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Note:

Center Discussion Papers are preliminary materials
circulated to stimulate discussicn and critical
comment. References in publications to Discussion
Papers should be cleared with the author to protect
the tentative character of these papers.

Chapte.r V ( Part A)
The .i:.Iechanisms for Containin g Imports:
The sxstem during 1971 and a Retrospec tive Look at Its Evolution (Import Controls) *
We now come to the cornersto ne of the Colombian system for restrainin g
the demand for imports:

the controls require registrat ion of all imports

with the relevant authority , which is now INCOMEX, invested with the power
to prohibit or requiring prior approval of import trans.acti ons.

This

chapter will first explain the terms frequentl y used in the Colombian import
licensing system, to be followea. by a sketch of its historica l evolution .
The core of the chapter is a detailed examinati on of how the system worked
circa 1970-71, including a..'1 attempt to quantify its decision-m aking process.
This will be followed by a look at some of the effects of the whole import
repressin g system, including tools discussed earlier, on the Colombian
economy.

Although the focus of attention is on merchand ise imports, the

chapter will close with a discussio n of the exchange controls designed
to repress the demand for im,orted services, and regulate capital flows,

inward as well as outward.
Some Key Definitio ns

Tl1e Colom.biar1 state 1~ecords tl1e import process at several points:

it first requires the registrat ion of all intention s to import goods with

INCOMEX, at fob values, except for

11

minor" imports; those intention s

become registere d only after they are approved.
approval is granted almost automatic ally.

For items in the free list

When the goods come into the

country and clear customs, they are recorded at customs, cif values.
Finally, when the importer draws foreign excha.'1ge from the Central Barut,
those excha...~ge disbu~sem ents are noted.

To obtain foreign exchange, the

importer must present proof that goods have cleared customs.

Table V-1

shows these aifferent magnitude s for recent years; allowing for lags,
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It appears that the

registrations and customs values are roughly equal.

cif/fob differential is offset by the cancellations, post-registration
discounts, non-use, etc., of some registrations.

Exc~ange disbursements

are lower than import values for the simple reason that many imports are
financed by foreign credits, or covered by compensation agreements; the
servicing of such debt is recorded under other items.
The lag between application for an import license and its approval
which implies registration, for goods in the prior list, has fluctuated
COI).Siderably during postwar II.
to one month and a half.

During 1970-71 it was of about one month

'I'he lag between registration and the time

the goods actually go through customs depends of course on the nature
of the commodity; it is saicl to average 4 or 5 months.

'Ihe lag between

arrival and excha.~ge disbursement, for those imports not financed by long
term credit, is cf about one month, under normal conditions.
The average link between actue.l imports (customs) and registrations
can be seen in the following regressior., using annual dollar data for

1950 through 1970:

{l)

[CUSTOMS\ = 80.8 + 0.66
(1.6)

[REGISTR.]+ + 0.23

(6.4)

u

(1.8)

[REGISTR.]t-l

2

R = 0.87
F-test = 58.8
DW = 2.9
From 1962 thr01..1Gh 1969 this regression yields alternating underand over-estimates of 2.ctual imports; thus, predicted customs imports for

1963 are 9 percent above actual ones, those for 1964 are 6 percent below,
in 1965 they are 16 percent above, etc.

'Ihe missing expla'l'latory variable,

-2a-

Table V-1
Merchandise Imports; Registrations. Customs Values
and Exchange Disbursements, 1963-71

(Annual Averages in Million Current US Dollars)

1971

1963-66

1967-70

Total Registrations (fob value)

552.1

706.2

784.8

Reimbursable

484.4

596.1

710.4

390.8
38.8

414.9

618.1
38.0

Ordinary draft
Compensation agreements
AID credits
Other credits
Special import-export systems

20.2
27.0

Merchandise imports (customs. cif)

13.0

15.3
26.0

110,l

74.4

18.9
48.7

71.7

35.9
38.6

555.0

667.4

7.6

Ex.change Disbursements for Imports (fob)

Sources and Method:

86.o
16.9
18.3

Non-reimbursa~
With foreign loans
Other

60.0

BdlR - RdBdlR, several issues.

38.5

475,3

612.7

-3-

it was at first thought, was the past, actual and expected exchange rate
behavior, on the grounds that expected devaluation, say, would induce
holders of registered licenses to hurry-up the arrival and thus the
payment for the merchandise.

But experiments putting exchange rate changes

in regression (1), lagged backwards and forward, yielded poor results.
The best is the following:
(2)

[CUST0MS)t = 92.3 + 0.74 [REGISTR.]t + 0.11 [REGISTR.)t-l

{1.8)

(6.1)

(o.6)

+ C.74 [EXCH. RATE]t+l
(1.2)
R2

F-test
DW

= o.88
= 40 .8
= 3.1

In this regression, the actual percentage chanee in the rea1 average

import exchange rate a year ahead presumably picks ur, (realized)
expectations about its movements.

But clearly there are ad hoc factors

influencing in a given year the lag between customs flow and registration;
for example, a plausible reason for regression (1) to predict for 1963 a customs
flow 9 percent below the actual one relates to doubts regarding how long
import liberalization would last, provoking a quick realization of registered
intentions to import.

And once this happens for a year, the opposite can

be expected for the next.
Regression (1) indicates that two-thirds of registrations are, on average,
turned into actual imports within the same year, suggesting an average lag
of 4 months.

Note, however, that the coefficients for both registration

varia"bles add up to only O. 89, and that longer lags yielded insignificant
results.

-4INCOMEX and its predecessors have classified registrations according
to:

(a) manner of payments to which they give rise; (b) types of

importers; and (c) particular regime to which imports are subject.
The classification used at present as to the manner of payments for
imports is presented in Table V-1.

The reimbursable vs. non-reimbursable

distinctions is less helpful than it appears, because although all non
reimbursable imports are financed by long- or medium-term credits, or
involve imports of direct foreign investors or gifts and donations, not
all reimbursable imports are covered

by

current exchange earnings.

The

distinction turns out to hinge on whether the foreign exchange used to
pay for imports is or is not at the disposal of the Banco de la Republica,
directly or indirectly.

Thus, imports financed by AID credits deposited

wiLh the CeHL:t·al Bank .are reiw.l>u.rl:lable, h•hile those using IBRD or IADB

loans, whose cash is kept in Washington, are considered non-reimbursable.
Imports from cou..'1'1tries with which Colombia has bilateral payments agreements,
as well as those from LA.FTA, come under the reimbursable category, as

of foreign investment involving directly machinery imports is placed under
"non-reimbursable"; other parts which may involve a dollar inflow deposited
in the Central Bank to pay for other imports would come under "reimbursable."
The distinction according to ty2es of importers is of more general
interest.
categories:

Published import registrations are subdivided into three
industry, commerce and official.

For internal use, INCOMEX

has a somewhat more complicated classification; there is a fourth major
group, !!occasional" requests, made up mainly

by

import applications from

construction firms, professionals, private individuals and even some public

-5agencies, as well as other minor subdivisions.

In published registrations,

"i.ndustry" includes imports to be transformed and used as imports directly
by those requesting the license; "commerce II those to be resold by established
commercial firms, without substantially altering the imported item.

Approved

"occasional n requests appear mainly under "commerce" in published registration.
The "official" category covers imports destined for the public sector;
however, INCOMEX subdivides these applications into commercial and
industrial categories for internal use, and published data also contain
under "industryn imports of some public enterprises, such as the steel
mill of Paz del Rio.

Partly as a result of foreign

11

tied aid", and partly

due to protectionist pressures, by law all official imports must go
through the prior license procedure, i.e., they are ex-c.luded frcm the
free list.
Colombia has no state-trading agencies outside the quasi-official
Coffee Growers

I

Federation (il: principle a private group) and IDEMA, in

charge of distributing basic foodstuffs.

The former handles directly the

major share of coffee exports, while the latter frequently imports in
bulk, particularly from countries whose export trade is in state hands.
For example, during recent years IDEivT.A has imported Chilean apples.
Only approved (registered) license requests are published; during
1971, of all registered reimbursable imports 56 percent fell under the
"industry II category, 24 percent under ncommerce II and 20 percent under
"official."
respectively.

For 1970 the corresponding figures were 53, 29 and 19 percent,
It may be estimated that during 1971 total requests, including

those rejected, followed roughly the same breakdown, with the share for
commerce slightly higher than these for industry and official.

.,

The high share of Dnport demand and of actual imports accounted for
by direct users, whether private or public, is remarkable, and reflects

the low share of consumer goods in the import bill.

Note also that

given what is known about import prohibitions and INCOMEX policies,
a large fraction of the ex-ante demand does not bother to apply for
import permits • Furthermore, many small enterpreneurs and individuals
not used to dealing with government bureaucracies may get discouraged even
when their potential applications have a good chance of being approved.
All importable items fall under one of three regimes or lists:
the prohibited, the free or the prior license list.

1

It will be seen

that the coverage o~ these lists fluctuated considerably during the 1960s.
During 1971, about 16 percent of all items (including subcategories)
into which the Colombian tarif'i' is divided were placed on the prohibited
list.

Table V-2 shows thst list includes candidates for agricultural

protectionism in rich and poor countries alike {e.g., meat, corn, dairy
products, etc.}, luxury products (e.g., furs, precious metals, jewelry,
velvets, etc.), anC items for which prohibitions appear redundant (e.g.,

coffee, cocoa, sugar, clothes, wood manufactures, etc.).

An

eccentric

who wished to import coffee i:rito Colombia, incidentally, would face not
only a flat prohibition, but aJ.so a d.uty of 85 percent (if the bean is

untoasted) or 170 Percent (for toasted beans), plus a prior deposit of
130 percent.
drugs.

The list also includes items such as arms and habit-forming

Note that while among the tariff chapters identified in Table V-2,

which accou::.1t for two--thirds of s.ll p.·ohibited. items and contain mainly
consumer goods, the percentage of pror_ibitions was 66, for the rest of
the tariff only 6 percent of t:::_2 categories were :prohibited.

Under special

.

-6aTable V-2
Examples of Tariff Chapters with Abundant Prohibitions Circa 1971

Chapter Number and Description

Total Items in
the Chapter

Prohibited
Items

20

18
16

20
10
13

24
74

69

26

10

34

29

61
88

27

2 Meat and edible offal
3 Fish, shellfish and molluscs
4 Milk and dairy products, eggs, honey

7 Edible legumes, vegetables, plants
roots, tubes
8 Edible fruits and peels
9 Coffee(!), Tea, and Spices
11 Milling foodstuffs, malt, starches
12 Oilseeds, sundry seeds, industrial and
medicinal plants, fodder
15 fl.ci~e.l. and vegetable oils, fats
18 Cocoa and its products
19 Pastries, products based on flour, cereals,
etc.
20 Preserves of vegetables, plants, fruits
21 Sundry foodstuffs
22 Beverages, alcoholic drinks, vinegar
41 Furs, leather and their manufactures
44 Wood and its manufactures
58 Rugs, felps, ribbons, embroidery, velvets,
tulle, .etc •
60 Knitted goods
61 Other clothing ~nd apparel
68 Ceramics, glass, cement and their manufactures
71 Precious stones, metals and their manufactures
Sub-total
Other chapters
TOTAL
Sources and Method:

7

20

54

6

10

6

24
18

21
11
11
11
25

33

26
35
6L
25

49

23

24
22
15

70~(

469
,......,,-

46
38

16

3,643

t:::.):;)

4,350

704

Information obtained from Arancel·de Aduanas, OE- cit.

-7circumstances goods in the prohibited list can be imported, as under
the "Plan Vallejo. 11

During 1971, for example, nearly one percent of all

registered reimbursable imports were items in the prohibited list.

It

may be noted also that some goods are prohibited for most purposes, but
subject to prior licenses for a few other, e.g., some tY)?es of paper,
prohibited except for use of the printing and publishing establishments.
The free list, besides Plan Vallejo and LAFTA imports, included during
August 1971 only about 150 items, or 3 percent of all categories in the
tariff.

However, free list items accounted for 29 percent of all registered

reimbursable imports in 1971 and 23 percent of all imports registered (the
free list is limited to reimbursable imports).

Free list items can be

brought into Colomliia without a prior license; all that is req_uired, in
principle, besides payment of duties and prior deposits, is the registration
of those imports with INCCMEX.

Typically such process iS routine, but

INCOMEX can c.hallenge the dollar prices appearing in the registration; such
control is justified on grounds of combatting overinvoicing, and can lead
to denial of registration even of items in the free list.

The threat is

not just theoretical; e.g., some book imports have been held up recently
for this reason.
Goods in the free list include primarily some spare parts, certain
raw materials and intermediate products, scientific and medical eq_uipment,
and other capital goods.

Examples of the latter are harvesters, helicopters,

chicken incubators, some electrical generators, tractors, many types of
engines, etc.

Among the rest one finds unmanufactured copper, lead, zinc,

aluminum; some types of steel and nickel sheets; newsprint, etc.

Of all

-8-tariff items (528) in chapters 84 and 85, which include most electrical
and non-electrical machinery and equipment, excluding transport, nearly
10 percent were on the free J.ist.

As with the tariff, import controls

are biased against the importation of used goods; it is explicitly stated
in the regulations covering the free list that only new and unused
merchandise can be brought in under that list. 2
Goods neither in the prohibited for the free list are subject to
prior licensing, which covers the bulk of imports.

Items can be

moved from one list to another by a simple decision of INCOMEX; so long
as a given commodity remains in the free list, it could be said that its
demand depends only on income, prices, tariffs, etc., but in reality this
is so only so long as that demand stays within the limits foreseen by the
authorities.

It has rwL lieen u11usual in the past for the control authorities

to curtail or eliminate the free list when demand pressure became too great;
this is why in Chapter II no distinction was made among prohibited, prior
license and free import lists when deriving the overall import function.
ThP.rP. i

l'l

A.

f'11rt.hPr

distinction, primarily applied to

between global licenses and ordinary or regular licenses.

Global licenses,

started in 1965, apply basically to imports of capital goods for projects
involving the creation modernization or expansion of capacity, exceeding
US$40,000 and, if granted, are simply an approval in principle to import.
After obtaining a global license, an importer is typically given about 3
months to apply for ordinary licenses; extensions, however, are possible,
and longer time limits are also given depending on the nature of the project.
When a company is planning new investment, for example, it submits a

-9description of the project, in the form of a feasibility study with a 19
page questionnaire, together with estimated import requirements to
INCOMEX, which has a special section for analyzing those projects.

The

motivation given for global licenses is to avoid having a situation in
which projects are delayed by having, say, 90 percent of import requirements
approved, but a few critical requests rejected.

Once a global license

has been obtained, the normal expectation is that all required licenses,
which must still be presented for each individual project, will be approved.
Another advantage associated with global licenses is that they are typically
accompanied by the irgravamen 1'.1.nico, 11 or single tariff.

By this procedure,

the importer will pay a single rate of duty on all capital goods, a rate
which is below the average for all the individual items.
Global licenses are not obligatory ±'or investment projects, but highly
convenient; they give the government an important tool to control private
capital formation, and enterpreneurs a way to commit the government to the
realization of a project.

In the difficult year of 1967, global licenses

worth US$48 .4 Million 1-rere approved and US$7 .4 were rejected; in 1969 appi~ovals

reached US$110.2 Million, and the corresponding number for 1970 was $84.7
Million.

In contrast, actual imports of all capital goods during 1969-70

averaged US$346 .1 Million annually.
A Historical Sketch of the Import Control System3
In spite of an increase in the dollar value of Colombian exports from
$81 Million in 1938 to $284 Million in 1948, more than a three-fold
increase in ten years, foreign exchange reserves declined during 1946-48,
and the import and exchange controls which began during the Great Depression

-10became increasingly detailed and complex.

As noted in Chapter I, exchange

rate policy appears to have become frozen by the peculiar circumstances
of World war and postwar II, leading to an overvaluation trend.
By 1949, import licenses were granted up to the limits of individual
exchange quotas computed on the basis of the importer's production, sales
and other criteria.

During 1950, the allocation of exchange quotas

to individual importers began to be determined on a basis of their captial,
expenses and total personnel.

For some co:m.'nodities, such as drugs and

pharmaceutical s, import licenses were issued w:i.thout' regard for the exchange
quotas.

Thus, the non-reimbursab le categor;y was already present, and

at that time it probably included many imports financed with dollars acquired
in the black market; licenses for the purchase of certain imports were
given preferential trec1.tment.

Most imports were effected at the basic

exchange rate of 1.96 Pesos, but had to bear varying amounts of exchange
taxes ( from 10 to 30 percent).

Import of machinery and equipment were

effected at mixed rates, made up of varying proportions of the basic
selling rate, and of the exchange certificate market, which in December 1949
stood at 2.86 Pesos.

!!Luxury" ir.iports went through this latter market,

and also bore exchange taxes.
This system was conducive to tinkering and proliferation of multiple
rates, and up until March 1951 numerous adjustments were made to
exchange taxes, proportions in the mixed rates, goods which could be
imported outside individual exchange quotas, etc.

Apparently, there were

considerable criticisms of the efficiency, fairness and nonesty with which
the system was run, and one of the directors of the ccntrol mechanism was
even assasinated.

-11On March 1951 the basic import rate was devalue d to 2.5 Pesos for
US dollar , and a prohib ited list of about 1,200 specifi ed luxury or
locally -produ ced items was created .

But practic ally all licensi ng restric tions

on imports were remove d, and major exchang e taxes, as well as mixed or
multip le
rates were abolish ed.

Prior import deposi ts were also liberal ized, and

stood at only 10 percen t during 1952.

Imports still require d registr ation,

but this became a routine matter ; if the applica tion met all legal requir
e
ments registr ation was automa tic.

A

minor stamp tax of 3 percen t was

collect ed on all registr ations ; a few imports req_uire d prior approv al
of
certain minist ries (e.g., for health reason s, as in many indust rialize
d
countr ies).

Even some items in the prohib ited list could be importe d if

they origina ted in countri es having either a -balanced. trade or barter
and paymen t agreem ents with CoJ_o:r!lbia, and other prohib itions were lifted
if "expor t vouche rs n (introd uced in August 1952) issued. for certain minor
exports were used to finance their import ation, so long as those exports
and imports related to the same foreign country .

In short, the March 1951

simpli ficatio n and liberal ization of the contro l mechan ism, coupled with
favorab le conditi ons in the world coffee market , ush~red the freest postwa
r
II era for Colomb ian import ers, which was to last, with minor modifi cations
,
through the end of 1954.

During part of 1954 even the prohib ited list

was abolish ed, and replace d with a flat 40 percen t tax.
As the domest ic boom got out of hand

a-rid

coffee prices began to

waver late in 1954, the author ities chose to hold on to the 2.5 Pesos
rate and reinfor ce and reintro duce exchang e taxes and regula tions, withou
t,
howeve r, restric ting most import registr ations .

First in Octobe r 1954

and then more thoroug hly in Februa ry 1955 imports were reclas sified and
"stamp" taxes on import registr ations were drastic ally increas ed, while

--.12-

prohibitions were once again enforced.

Six import categories were created:

Pr~ferential (raw materials for essential industries), other raw materials
and essential products, essential durable and semidurable goods, less
essential goods, importable only from certain countries, specified non
essential goods and prohibited (luxury) goods.
to 100 percent.

Stamp taxes went from 3

Imports of some foodstuffs were to be handled. only by a

special corporation.

Prior import deposits were raised.

Since late 1954,

the granting of the exchange for import payments was made contingent upon
arrival of the merchandise in Colombia, a regulation which had been abolished
in November 1951.
As import pressure continued to grow, a free market import rate was
introduced in May 1955; most nontrade transactions and less essential imports
By the end of 1955, the fluctuating

were shifted to LhaL new market.
free market rate had reached

1+.2

Pesos.

The :payments situation, however,,

continued deteriorating; it appears that at that time attempts at control
relied mainly on indirect measures, such as stamp taxes, the free market

rate, etc,, plus exchange control.

In other words, "essential" imports

continued being registered freely and flooded into the country, and they
remained the bulk of the import bill~ while the queus waiting to buy foreign
exchange for 2.5 Pesos at the Central Bank became longer.

By June 1956,

authorities gave importers waiting for exchange authcrizations the option
to buy immediately exchange at the official rate of 2.5 Pesos for half of
the value of their pending applications, if they obtained the other half
in the free market, which at that time stood at about
end of 1956, that rate was 6 .5 Pesos.

4.7 Pesos.

By

the

Tb.e payments crisis provoked in

October 1956 the closing of the exchange registration office, except for the

-l3consideration of applications for vital imports; it was reopened, with
tighter regulations, and prohibitions in January 1957.

Most import

registrations were also suspended during those months, and their easy
granting came to an end; from January 1957 on, import control became
the first and major hurdle faced by potential importers, before they reached
the exchange window.
These changes came too late, of course, to avoid a sharp increase
in Colombian commercial arrears, which began to be noticed late in 1954,
and by the end of 1956 had. reached roughly $400 Million dollars.

The

payments crisis, falling coffee prices, and domestic inflation cum
stagnation contributed to the overthrow of the government of General
Rojas in May 1957.

The lesson that exchange controls buttressing a

pegged rate, without p.ri01· lrnpurt li. ::em; lug, can eai:d.ly lead to
payments trouble :t..as influenced Colombian import control policy to this day.
The statilization plan of June 1957 placed all import payments under
a new certificate rate, which by December 1957 stood at 5 .4 Pesos, abolishing
the grossly undervalued 2 .5 Pesos rate.

Pavments for most imnorts were
V

-

-

---.,,_-

~

-

~

.

subject to a 10 percent remittance tax, so the de facto rate reached six
Pesos.

All imports were still subject to registration and lists of

prohibited, free and prior license imports were established; this control
system, which with further refinements is the one now· in effect, was
consolidated by Law 1 of January 1959.

Prior exchange registration was

also enforced systematically beginning in 1957 for import payments,
requiring submission of import registration plus evidence that the goods
had entered Colombia.

Importers were given the choice of paying using

a free market (at 6.2 Pesos at the end of 1957) in which case they were

-l4exemp ted from the 10 percen t remitt ance tax.

The highe r import exchan ge

of import
rates, and toughe r prior impor t depos its, allowe d the relaxa tion

tor
licens ing for some commo dities; during the second semes ter of 1957,
list,
examp le, two thirds of all impor t regist ration s were on the free
e
and only one third (mainl y capita l goods) fell under the prior licens
But the rate of refuse d reques ts for goods in the prior licens e

list.

ts
list if said to have been high, nearly 40 percen t by value of reques
during those diffic ult month s.
nts
After the comme rcial arrear s had been liquid ated, and the peyme
res of
crisis and inflat ionary pressu res dampened by the auste rity measu

1957 and 1958, growth began to pick up again in a climat e of stabil ity.
but
Throug hout 1959, 1960 and even 1961, import contro ls remain ed severe
ge
fairly steady ; some even saw a t:r:·end toward libcro .lizati on as exchan
reserv es recove red.
low.

Certai nly impor ts recove red steadi ly from their 1958

an
But, as alread y noted in Chapte r IV, $UCh optimi sm also led to

the free
abandonment of exchan ge rate flexib ility; in fact, during 1960
minor
rate, applie d mainly to capita l movements, invi·si bles and most
but also
expor ts, came increa singly under fire not only within Colombia
the
among intern ationa l civil servan ts, who urged its unific ation with
more

11

stable 11 certif icate rate.

During 1961, howev er, it became obviou s

would be
that such unific ation, at least at the lower certif icate rate,
foolha rdy.
the
Diffic ulties in ~he world coffee marke t contin ues to be used as
major justif icatio n for rigoro us impor t contro ls.

By 1960 it was felt

restri cted
that about one fourth or one third of poten tial import demand was
by the flat prohib itions ,
by the licens ing system , and that this was done more

frequently of protectionist intent, than b;y rejecti0n of license applications.
About half of the items in the tariff were at that time in the prohibited
list; within registered imports, the share of those in the free list had
declined slightly to

60 percent, from about 65 percent in 1959.

The value

of import license requests rejected as a percentage of the value of all
license applications fluctuated around 15 percent throughout 1958,

1960.

1959 and

These rates of rejection underestimate the strength of import demand

not only because of the existence (and changing size) of the prohibited list,
but also because the Superintendency of Imports, and later INCONEX, made it
a practice to discourage applications doomed to failure by reacting negatively
to informal inquiries.

The depressed conditions of the world coffee market

also led Colombian authorities about this time to use the licensing mechanism

to discriminate

by oource of imports, o.s part of bi.lateral deals involving

mostly new coffee exports.

Imports not normally permitted were occasionally

allowed from bilateral partners (e.g., 2..utomotors, giving the Colombian
stock of such vehicles a very heterogeneous and :picturesque nature, including
rural jeeps in urban centers) in exchange for coffee sold at de facto
discounts perhaps as high as 20 percent.

During 1961, about US$30 ~lillion

worth of imports were licensed under barter and bilateral agreements.
By early 1962 it became clear that the co:mmitment to a pegged import

rate would have to be buttressed using other import represaing policies;
in April 1962 import pr:'.or deposits were raised, and import licensing
hardened.

By September 1962 virtually all imports were made subject to

prior

licensing; and in lJovember new import registrations were corepletely si.:.spended
for six weeks .

'Ihe free rate, which a:uring the first half of

1960 had remained

steady at about 6. 8 Fe sos, end.eel tnat year at 7 .2, and by December 1961 had

-16reached 8.8 Pesos.

It showed great instabj_lity during 1962, and finished

that year at 11.1 Pesos. 5
In the new cycle following the devaluation in Hovember 1962 of the
basic import rate, the expected relaxation of import controls did not last
long as a result of the failure of that stabilization program to significantly
change relative prices.

The prestige of licensing as the tool to repress

imports rose as that of exchange rate devaluation su.,k; during 1963 and 1964 it
became almost unthinkable to again move the 9 Pesos peg applicable to imports;
even the January 1963 pegging of the 10 Pesos free rate withstood pressures
until October 1964.

IJati.:rally, the share of imports in the free list in

total registration fell from 60 percent in 1960-61 to about 35 percent in late
1964 and lower still in early 1965.

The time taken to decide on import

reQuests lengthened, and during the last half of 1964 it reached, on average,
nearly three months.

Prior import deposits were kept in the Central Bank

longer than usual, going often beyond ten months .

By

late 1964 about 35

percent of all license applications were teing refused, and bitter and

On December 1964 the free list was suspended first for 90 days, but its
elimination was continued until September 1965; prior exchange registration
was made more difficult, resulting in a new piling up of commercial arrears.
Early in 1965 prohibitions were extended, and licensing became increasingly slow
and difficult, particularly for capital goods. 6

Fresh attempts were made to

divert both private and official imports toward bilateral partners,
particularly with capital goods such as acricultural and construction machinery,
elevators, tractors , trucl:s and other vehicles •

Some Colombian trading partners

which felt injured by these practices, particularly the U.S. and the Federal

Republic of Germany, made their displeasure known directly and indirectly.
The chaotic first semester of 1965 gave new ammunition to those wishing
to rely less on controls and more on a highe1~ import exchange rate.

By

April 1965 average delays in handling import requests reached 6 months, and
pressures on control authorities mounted.

The top political leadership,

however, remembering the debacle following the devaluation of November 1962,
fiercely opposed any such move.

Thanks to the fine work of the

Monetaria, 11 a compromise -;;as finally workecl out:

11

.Junta

on September 1965 the official

market was divided into a preferential rate, at the old 9 Pesos parity, for
foodstuffs, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, etc., and a new intermediate rate
of 13.5 Pesos, 7 to which less essential imports would be gradually transferred.
The free rate which had reached 19.2 Pesos i~ August 1965, fell to 17.8 Pesos
by

October 1965, so political authorities could argue, for debating purposes,

that their actions had actually led to a peso. appreciation.
On such shaky and tricky foundations was based the most systematic
attempt at import liberalization attempted in Colombia during postwar II,
with Colombian and international

tP.chni ci 1=1nR think; ng t.hAy

had. outfoxed

what they regarded as an economically illiterate political leadership.

Because

of the lack of candor and clarity with which the plan was launched, a number
of points were left ambiguous, and were to haunt policy makers a year later.
In particular, whether or not the plan included a willingness to change
upwards the 13.5 Peso rate was left fuzzy; in September 1965 such fuzziness
was part of selling the ps.ckage and avoiding inflationary expectations,
a H. 1963, but by September 1966 this was a source of irritation between
Colombians and international creditors.

il.mong the latter, some were convinced

in 1965 that Colombiar2 authoritj_es had corrnm.tted themse.:i..ves, to, if necessary,
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depreciating the intermediate rate, in line with a policy of exchange
flexibility, rather than reverse import liberalization.

In fact, they

expected such further devaluations to be necessary, suspecting that the
13. 5 Peso rate was too low.

Other architects :and spcnsors of the plan,.·

one may speculate, probably assumed that impor·t liberalization would
inevitably drag the authorities, unable to reverse liberalization, to further
devaluations in the future, whether or not they were willing to consider
such possibility in September 1965.

By this time, it should be noted,

the Monetary Board had been given the power to make exchange rate adjustments
at any time and of any size.

The free rate was still allowed to fluctuate

freely, and some hoped that eventually an upward crawling intermediate
rate would reach and merge with the free rate.

The progressive liberalization

of import controls would test the appropriateness of the 13 .'.) .Peso rate, which
was to yield if the import surged proved to be too great. A species of
"chicken II game was set up.
The original plan called for a removal within six months of prior
licensing en about half of all imports, 1-rhich

e1rPr1+.,1~11y Wt'"\nl C1 hP PxtP.nrlP-il.

to 65 percent of all imports; it was expected that imports of capital goods
for industrial plants would be kept under control as part of the mechanism
for investment planning.

In fact the pace of liberalization went even faster.

The free list was expanded in each of the following dates:

September 8,

November 11, January 27, 1966, February 22, Feburary 28, rfarch 17, July 29,
and August 21.

By this latter date nearly all imports had -been moved to

the intermediate exchange rate; most imports were now either prohibited
or in the free list, although some remained subject to prior licensing.
Furthermore, starting in October 1965, advance import deposits were reduced

-19every month by 5 percent of the rates in force on September 30; the plan
called for continuing this rhythm until those deposits were eliminated
In late August 1966, however, it was announced that

in twenty months.

those 5 percent cuts were to be quarterly, not monthly, starting in
November, 1966.

It will be recalled that between September 1965 and

August 1966, numerous modifications, mainly upward, were also introduced
in the tariff, in principle to harmonize it with inport liberalization .
As seen in Table II-2, the customs value of imports surged after
the fourth quarter of 1965; import registrations had already picked
For the whole of 1965, of all registered imports

up in that quarter.

only 15 percent had oeen on the free list; the corre~ponding figu~~ for

1966 was 56 percent.

It may be noted that this liberalization did not

much change the prchibited list.
The free list, which by October 1966 was accounting for about 80
percent of all registered imports,rhad totally disappeared by December,
by which date the liberalization episode appeared to lie thoroughly
wrecked.

This dramatic policy turnaro1111d 1vill be

the next chapter.

Pv~mi nP.ii in

detail in

Throughout 1967 import controls were rigorously

enforced; there was practically no free list, and it is said that of
the total number of import license requests presented, about 40 percent
were rejected.

In terms of value, about 25 percent of total requests

were turned dmm; the percentage was lower for global and non-reimbursab le
requests, and higher for reimbursable- ones.

Steep prior import deposits

were reintroduced and exchange controls were tightened.

Imports dwindled;

their custom value in 1967 was 26 percent below 1966, while the drop in
registrations was of 18 percent .

Only since May 1968 did the free list
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regain some significance; free list registrations were only 4 percent of
all reimbursable import registrations in 1967, rising to 12 percent in
1968.

The liberalization rock continued to be pushed uphill, slowly,

once again; the free list by 1970 had reached 20 percent of all reimbursable
registrations (17 percent of all registrations).

During 1968 prior import

deposits began to be lowered once again, a process which has continued
throughout 1972.
Beginning in March 1967 the import and exchange control system took
the basic shape it had circa 1971.

It is generally granted that a number

of administrative improvements were introduced during these years; the
next section will present a closer look at its operation around 1971.

It

should be borne in mind that the next section is a snapshot of a system
slowly evolving in the direction oi' liberalization.

Indeed, much of the fine

reputation of the present Colombian system of import control may be due to
the fact tha it has presided over a situation of gradual relaxation and
growing exchange availabilities.
tujder a larger gap between ex=ante

It is not clear how it would hold up
demand and exchange
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The Operation of Import Controls during 1971
All potential importers must present INCOl•lEX with a detailed
description of the goods they wish to purchase, intended means and timing
of payment, and must also complete a questionnaire '(following resolution
15 of 1967) , giving c-ompany information on payroll, number of workers,
capacity, imports during current and previous three years, income and
sales taxes paid during current and previous three years, minor exports
for the same period, previous imports of the products they wish to import,
inventories of those products and their expected duration, etc.

A different

form must usually ce completed for each commodity, although exceptions
to this rule are possible; there are slightly different resolution 15
forms for industry, commerce and official requests.
The INCOMEX stc:1,ff first checks to see whether all the required
documentation and information has been presented fully and accurately.
Besides import description and the resolution 15 form, importers must show
evidence of tax settlements, and of having carried out required prior
import deposits.

In principle, then, the mechanism of import control

can reinforce the Treasury's efforts to reduce tax evasion, particularly
among commercial houses.

At this stage, import applications can be returned

(not officially rejected) on grounds of improper completion of forms.
8
INCOMEX argues that such devolutions: are done on purely technical grounds,
e.g., because the description of the proposed import is sketchy, which
may lead to trouble at customs when it arrives in the country, and complains
that the careless company employees who completed the forms then call
such devolutions rejections, to protect themselves.

Problems arise
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particularly with new or complex products.

In fact, the punctilliousness

with which INCOMEX insists on the quality of information on import
requests can be adjusted depending on the pressure of import demand.
Whether an import request is returned or rejected, the potential importer
can resubmit a new at once.

During 1971, it may be estimated that of

the total value of requested imports, only about 3 percent were returned
for containing insufficient information or procedural mistakes.
If the application is satisfactory in form, the INCOMEX staff next
examines whether products similar to those requested are produced locally.
Extensive files on domestic production have been built up during the last
few years .

There is at this point a frank and clear protectionist bias;

in case of doubt, the presump t::Lon is that local goods are indeed fully
satisfactory candidates for import-replacement, at least regarding their
physical attributes.

Potential importers whose requests have been turned

down on these grounds bear the burden of demonstrating to INCOMEX that
local production is in fact different from possible imports because of
quality, product specification, etc.

Price differences, unless "outrageous,"

are not considered valid grounds for importing.

IHCOMEX occasionally

brings together the potential importer and the local import-competing
producer, to iron out serious disagreements regarding prices and whether
or not the good in questi~n has the same quality and specifications.
INCOMEX officials occasionally visit plants of import-competing firms to
verify their capacity, output quality, etc., a time-consuming and ad-hoc
practice.
As a third step, the INCOl,IBX staff looks closely at the unit dollar
price of the potential import.

The point here is not to keep track of

I

'

-23margins between Colombian and world prices, but to control overinvoicing
of raw materials and parts, particularly by subsidiaries of foreign
INCOMEX and other Colombian

companies buying from their parents.

officials argue that pharmaceutical companies operating in Colombia, for
example, but owned from abroad, have been shown to have inflated the
value of their imports of raw materials, as a way of disguising profit

9
remittances abroad.

Thus, import control emerges also a tool to regulate

intra-company transfer of pricing, particularly for foreign investors
in the import competing sector.

The need for such regulation, of Course,

would disappear if those companies were not to receive protection against
imports of finished products.

Even items in the free list may be held up

if there is suspicion that dollar prices declared in the registration
11
request are out of l:Lne with "world prlces.

As much direct foreign investment takes the form of imports of
machinery and equipment, the registered value of those imports becomes
later on part of the base on which Colombian regulations compute allowable
profit remittances abroad.

It is thus important for the control system

to check on the real (international) value of the machinery, typically
brought in with non-reimbursable licenses.

Stories are told of gross

overvaluation in some license requests, designed to inflate the value of
foreign investment.
11
All of the above procedures are handled by the "Junta de Importaciones

satff, which does not have the power to reject or accept the applications
(although, as noted above, they can
grounds).

11

returnj 1 applications on procedural

That power, including the possibility of approving an application

partially, lies in the

0

Junta de Importaciones", a body of five permanent
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Decisions on all roughly 150,000

annual prior license applications must be made by this body, which handles
about 500 applications per day.

The work load is even higher than implied,

as the daily tasks are carried out typically by only 3 members
of the Junta, the others, particularly the INCOr.1EX head, having other duties.
The technical staff of the Junta is also small, fluctuating around 15
professionals plus supporting employees.

In spite of this staggering

burden, the Junta is kept deliberately small to minimize the danger of
corruption.

The same reason is given for keeping its operations in Bogota,

in spite of pressure from various reg:i.ons to decentralize the Junta's
decision-making powers.

The ,Junta decisions are, in principle, public;

article 75 of Law 444 of 1Carch 1967 orders INCO!oIBX to publish weekly all
import perml ts granLed, as well as publishlng other data on its operations.

Decisions on rejections have been published off and ,on; their public
knowledge for a while stim~lated fraudulent activities by individuals who
offered the unlucky applicants false contacts which presumably would
improve their chances in future applications.

Since 1967 the turnover

of Junta members has been low; for the three slots which are not ex-officio
there have been only 8 members during the last five years (two died on
the job).

The Junta is widely respected for its hard work and honesty;

it does lead a fishbowl existence.
The Junta de Importaciones receives each month from the Junta .Monetaria~
the top monetary authority, an overall foreign exchange budget fer all
imports, decided on the basis of actual and expected exchange earnings.
The import Junta then regulates its approvals to keep within that limit;
it may also be noted that it dislikes public announcements of changes in
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In

particular, rumors of a cut in the monthly limit are said to produce sharp
increases in license applications.
The Junta members are the first to admit that they follow no fast
and rigid rules when deciding on applications ( although unhelpful lists of
11

criteria 11 can be found in the relevant legislation, as in Article 77 of

Law

444), and that the process is highly subjective. There are no quotas

for particular products, nor for firms, nor for regions.

The major criterion

is a protectionist one, but occasionally imports are let in if the quality of
domestic output deteriorates markedly, or if domestic prices become "too"
high.

While Junta members say all the right things about scaring local

monopolistic positions by such actions, the implementation is ad-hoc, with
protectionist seuL.im.enL clorulnH-ting.

Throughout the 1960s, imports in the

prior license list have been informally subdivided into three groups; those for
which licensing depends on local supply conditions of competing products, those
generally aprroved, and those generally disapproved, but which are kept in
the prior list to discourage monopolistic practices of domestic producers.
The protectionist bias also shows in the occasional practice during the
1960s of transferring items from the free to the prior license or prohibited
categories as soon as a new plant begins to produce locally a. previously
importable good (that transfer may actually be done before the plant begins
to operate, to ward off inventory accumulation).

During recent years,

however, the number of items transferred into the prohibited list has
dwindled.

But the import control mechanisms has remained a key tool for

protecting large new ventures, such as the automobile industry, for which
special regimes and policies are established.

Junta officials defend their
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given other policies and circumstances

outside their control (exchange rate policy,' coffee prices, etc.), and given
the need to ration foreign exchange, what better criterion can one find
than to ask from potential importers whether or not they have checked to
see whether the product they wish to bring in can be found within Colombia?
.And in doubt is better to deny a request on protectionist grounds, it is
said, a decision which after all can be reversed, than to allow imports
demaging to a local producer, a decision more difficult to offset.

A last

argument given by Il'JCOMEX in favor of its protectionist stance will baffle
the pure trade theorist:

as there are very few firms exporting one hundred

percent of their output, they say, weakening the local base of most firms
by allowing
capacity.

0

excessive l! competition from inports will hurt their exporting

i\.s noti ccd in Chapter 3, this a:~gument bas short run validity

in a setting of monopolistic competition; its validity for the long run,
however, is very doubtful under most normal assumptions regarding firm
behavior.
The process of establishing whether or not there is domestic
production of a given item is not without loopholes; a given large company,
for example, can have a subsidiary declare that it does not produce locally
a given product, so that it is allowed to import it.

The same subsidiary

may declare to INCOMEX that it does produce the same i.tem, when a competitor
of the large company requests a license.

Given the limited staff of the

Junta de Importaciones, it is not always possible to check on these
ambiguities.

It is said that, particularly durin£ 1965, subsidiaries

were used in the way described.
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developed regions within 8olombia, and from firms with good records in
non-traditiona l exports (with or without the "Plan Vallejoil).

As discussed

below, the granting of global licenses typically involves negotiations
regarding export targets.

Firms with large tax payments are allegedly favored

over those paying few taxes, even if there is no evidence of tax evasion;
the argument given in that the g 9vernment has a fiscal interest in
channelling imports toward those firms which are good tax-yielding partners
of the public sector, which chooses to use large tax payments as prima facie
evidence of efficiency in the use of imported inputs.

Although the

Junta looks closely at past imports of the firms requesting fresh licenses,
it claims to take into account the needs of new importers, again "by ear."
Installed capacity is looked at, but so is employment; there is no obvious
a priori reason to expect such subjective process by itself to lead to a
bias in favor of capital-intensi ve activities greater than one in favor of
labor-intensive firms.

Some Junta members claim that their decisions are

also influenced by the state of labor relations in the firm requesting
a license; as "good 11 labor relations are likely to be associated with high
wages (and relatively low employment), a bias in favor of capital-intens ity
may be introduced this way.
The Junta de Importaciones also examines the actual and expected
inventories levels of the applying firm, and turns down a request if stocks
are deemed

11

excessive. 11

Inventories for 1+ to 6 months of production needs

are considered reasonable? and are encouraged to save INCOMEX the paper
work involved in more frequent requests associated with lower inventories.
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10 Given
not always fully recognized by those in charge of its operations.
the burden of work, and the speed with which application s must be
handled, there is an inevitable tendency to accept without much analysis
most "reasonable " requests from established , well-known (i.e., large)
companies, and to examine more closely and reject, in case of doubt or
stringency, those of lesser known, smaller newcomers, many of which may
not even bother to apply.

The Junta prides itself, with good reason, of

remaining open to complaints from importers, and its members incredibly
find time to listen to an unending stream of petitioners , whether powerful
or not.

Furthermore , it argues that at times of stringency, proportiona l

cuts in import requests are larger for bigger than for smaller firms, and
that it tends to overlook more easily faulty request forms from small
than from large importers.
But on balance, the larger and better known importers find it
easier to communicate with the Junta tha,,1 others.

3iven the Colombian

milieu, poter1tial sniall impo1-:ters may actually exaggerate in their 01•1n

minds the complicatio ns of dealing with IHCOMEX, housed incidentall y in
imposing offices in the highest floors of the tallest building of Bogota.
Some Junta officials candidly admit that this may be so, but given their
strong beliaf in the necessity of control, argue that there are no other
practical ways of handling the enormous mass of actual and potential
application s.

What is so wrong, they ask, with tilting in favor of application s

from long established corporation s, with honorable records, and of being
skeptical of new and unknown applicants, who may turn out to be no better
than phony industriali sts, disguised smugglers and black market operators?

-29In the Colombian social setting, where most people who "count n know each
other directly or indirectly, it is not difficult for control officials to
persuade themselves that all
handled appropriately.

11

legitimate 1; requests are sooner or later

Another justification given for a bias against some

small import requests is the fear that sue~ requests are simply a way to
seek legal 'jwindow-dressingn for contraband; a shop,· it is alleged, would

rely mainly on smuggled imports; but use an approved import license as
a cover-up for its mostly illegal activities.

A similar argument is

sometimes given to justify flat prohibitions of some imports, as that

way one is sure to know that if those goods are found within Colombia
they come from contraband.
The argument that large firms can use some imported capital goods
at fuller capacity than small ones is also heard; for example, import
requests for computers from small and medium size fi:nts are known to have
been denied on the grounds that they could. not use computers at full
capacity.

Similar requests frcm larger firms have been approved.

It is

also argued, not without reason~ the.t bulk buying by the large firms
abroad leads to dollar unit values for :Lmports lower than those which would
be obtained by many firms purchasing small amounts each.
The Junta keeps files of importers, including black or grey lists of
those caught engaging in what it regards as illegal or undesirable practices.
The total number of importers is said to reach about 12,000; it will be
seen below, however, that the number of major importers is considerably
less.
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imports simply reflects industrial, financial and geographical concentaation
in Colombia, which they neither reinforce nor weaken significantly.

The

elimination of import controls, by itself, is unlikely to change those
structural facts, they add.

To this difficult issue we will return below.

Given the location of the Junta in Bogota, Bogota-based companies
have an edge regarding access over those located elsewhere.

Pleas from

other cities, Cali and Medellfn in particular, for regional offices with
the power to decide over prior license imports have been turned down mainly
on the. grounds that such offices would be more subject to pressures
originating in feelings of regional solidarity or in baser motives.

At

present, only a few items in the free list can be registered at the 27
INCOMEX regional offices outslJ.e Bugota.

The shuttling between provincial

centers and Bogota is regarded as a small price to pay for maintaiinng
uniform national standards, a:.~d minimizing the chances of corruption
creeping into the decision-making process.
In a rr.en.o to the l':.::i.nister of Development in December, 1969, a group
of businessmen from the Cauca valley (where Cali is located) complained
about excessive centralization of all governmental functions in Bogota, leading
to "innumerable trips to arrange trivial details • "

They argued that as a

result, many corporate headquarters (if not whole plants) were being moved
from that valley to Bogota, depriving the former of many important ancilliary
activities, such as insurance, consulting and publicity.

INCOi'vlEX was listed

as the government office causing the largest number of trivial trips; there
were others, however, such as the Superintendency of Prices, the Superintendency
of Corporations, IFI, and the Ministries of Health, Agriculture, Labor and
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Centralized paper work associated with

import licenses was the main target; the memo urged that six regional
offices be given exchange quotas and be empowered to decide on license
requests for spare parts, raw materials and other inputs strategic to keep
production going, admitting that decisions on new capital goods or
peculiar cases should remain centralized in Bogota.

It is noteworthy

that this group of businessmen asked for the decentraliz ation of import
controls not their abolition.
It is generally admitted that re_quests under "commerceii are
scrutinized more rigorously and rejeeted more frequently than those under
"industry. 11

This is partly due to t:h.e bias favoring big established

firms, but also to a feeling that i tem.s reql;ested under commerce are less
"essential 11 than th-.~ othe.r·s .

Commerce, it is also argued, brings in a

general variety of imports to add to more or less ample stocks, and some
delay is ~likely to harm very much of anything~ while industrial requests
are of a very specific nature and are expected to get into production with
a shorter lag; at any ra.te, the pressing nature of industrial needs is

easier to demonstrate than that of commercial requests.

Whatever the reason,

this fact further reinforces the bias against smaller industrial firms,
which rely more on commercial intermediar ies for imported inputs than
the larger firms.
To summarize some of the problems of the small industrial firm,
particularl y one located outside Bogota:

in spite of its more difficult

access to credit, its inventories e.s a percentage of sales tends to be
higher than those of the larger firms, anyway; attempts to lower inventories

of imported items by relying on commercial intermediaries will be hampered
by the greater difficulties of the latter in obtaining permits, and by their
charging premia-inclusive prices for those items for which permits have
been obtained; attempts to lower imported inventories run the risk of
stopping production at times of crisis if EJCOMEX fails to handle license
requests quickly.
Applications in the

11

officialn category are in principle subjected

to the same procedure as others; as they involve duty-free imports, recently
there have been special efforts made to ascertain that they do not bring
into the country goods produced locally.

Attempts to influence the Junta

by open flexing of political muscle appear to be surprisingly limited;
import requests from the Armed Forces and Congress, of course, receive
very careful treatment, and rejections of Lhose .rey_uests 1::LI:'e documented
particularly well.

But there~ occasional rejections of applications

from those sources (often, alas, on ultra-protectionist grounds), as well
as from other powerful public agencies.

On balance, however, there is a

nresumntion that official reauests should be given nrioritv. and are said
~
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to fare better than private requests, particularly at times of stringency.
Traditionally, non-reimbursable license requests are said to have
had better chances of approval than reimbursable ones, simply because they
did not involve claims against Central Bank foreign exchaDge, and typically
involved capital goods not produced in Colombia.

Frequently they also

involved large :i;nfblic sector projects a..Dd international committments.

More

recently, however, both :protectionist and equity considerations have led
to higher rates of refusals for non-reimbursable requests.

The budding
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also pointing out the low duties (and frequent exemptions) on capital good
imports.

Local enterpreneurs have also loudly complained when direct

foreign investors have been allowed to bring in machinery, with non
reimbursable licenses, whose importation is not possible when requested
via the reimbursable category; it is (correctly) felt that such a situation
puts the local industrialist at an unfair disadvantage when competing in
the local market with foreign owned firms.

It may be noted, incidentally,

that INCOMEX generally follows a policy of non-discrimination between
import requests from locally and foreign owned companies located within
Colombia.

More on this below.

At a more pedestrian level, the possibility

of importing autos with non-reimbursable licenses, for example, would lead,
according ·Lo INCOMEX, Lo all kinds of illegal triangular deals; the tendency,
therefore, is to apply the same protectionist or equity criteria whether
or not the license request is reimbursable.
Searching for equity among established firms, the Junta often handles
several import requests from different ccm.panies for a given product~
particularly critical raw materials, in one bunch.

For example, when

several beer companies apply for imported hops, these requests are
considered togethe~, so as to avoid giving one company advantages over
the others simply on the basis of a temporarily better access to imported
inputs.

In the case of new comers to the industry, projected output is

taken into conside1Aation; for others, historical. imports provide a first
approximation to actual needs.

When some important raw material is both

imported and produced locally, and the latter is more expensive and/or of a
lower quality than the former, mixing rules are enforced, i.e., for each
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giving companies unfair advantage based on better access fo the superior
imported inputs.

When there are no obviously equitable arrangeme nts

possible, there is a tendency to deny all requests; it is argued that
it is better for all to do without imports than for a few to benefit
from unfair advantage s arising from a lucky access to those goods.

Such

favortism , even if random, would cast douot on the honesty and fairness of
the Junta.

Like Caesar's wife, the Junta knows that it must not only be

honest, but appear honest, even at the risk of being stern and unpleasan t.
(The possibili ty of auctionin g off licenses is not considere d to lie within
the rules of the game.)
In the case of requests for global licenses, covering investmen t projects,
the relevant departmen t of INCOJYIEX is supposed to cou.r·u.inate their study
of those projects with the National Planning Departmen t.

The Committee on

Global Licenses, which began operating during 1969, includes besides INCOMEX
and the Planning Departme nt, the Ministry of Development and IFI, a public
body which finances arid sometimes rlms j_ndustria l projects; this Committee
has witnessed on occasion bureaucr atic rivalries among its members.

The

Junta de Importaci ones retains the ultimate power to accept or reject the
applicati ons, and there have been cases when the Junta has taken decisions
contrary to the resolutio ns of the mixed Committee on Global Licenses.
The data which are required together with the request for global licenses
are extensive , and potential ly permit a fairly comprehen sive benefit-c ost
study of each investmen t project.

r,_;y L1pressio n, however, is that such

studies are not carried out, or at least not very thoroughl y.

There are

only five professio nals in the division of Global licenses, each of whom is

-35is supposed to stud:')r about 5 projects per week. 11

However, this mechanism

has been increasinely used to insure that new projects, particularly those
granted tax or other advantages, commit part of their expecte.d output
for exports; for several projects specific export targets have been laid
down at the time of their approval by INCOMEX, in the form of formal
contracts.

It is not in the HJCOMEX style to insist rigidly on the exact

compliance with such targets, but the companies know that systematic
departures from those promises can lead to a displeased and colder INCOMEX
in the future.

Once a global license has been obtained, ordinary requests

charged against it are typically granted almost automatically; furthermore,
changes in the specifications of equipment to be imported are allowed
with relative ease.

The processing of the global license request itself is

taking an average of about two months, although not surprisingly, there are
substantial variations from this average, depending on the nature of the
project.

It may be noted that in reviewing global licenses INCOMEX

examines the proposed ways of financing those imports, and can suggest

The 19-page questionnaire which must be completed in applying for a
global license is admittedly terrifying for a small entre:preneur, who in
all likelihood needs to hire a consultant to fill it out.

IHCOMEX has

been considering requiring a briefer questionnaire for smaller businessmen,
but as of September 1971 this had not been done.
In many cases, the same project processed by IlxCOl'iiEX with an eye on
import demand will also be analyzed by other members of the Committee on
Global Licenses, and the Cammi"'.::tee on Royalties (which supervises these

payments abroad), which have other major preoccupations besides import demand.

For example, all major direct foreign investments in Colombia must by
law be approved by the Planning office.

Projects financed by IFI will

of course be examined by that institution.

As noted above, the coordination

among different public agencies in this area leaves much to be desired;
overlap and conflict abound.
The mechanism for granting global licenses, originally designed
inter alia to save paper-work and to avoid complications at customs, and
the associated

11

grava,men unico•i or single tax have come under increasing

fire from within the government not only for lacking sufficient corrdination
with bodies outs id.e HfCOMEX, but also for excessive generosity in reducing
tariff rates on capital goods inputs.
Ordinary and global lice:ises are norillally examined b;,;r INCOMEX following
the chronologica,l order of presentation; ordinary licenses are decided
usually within a month or a month ru-:d a half of presentation, while for
global licenses the waiting period is naturall:r longer and less predictable.
Extensions and mofifications of ordinary licenses take less than a month.
r:NCOt~IBX claims that urge11t requests are handled even faster, if necessar'J

in a day (say in the case when parts are essential to prevent production
breakdowns).

Rejections of applications ar8 accompanied by the reason or

reasons given by the Junta for such a decision (there are 72 such possible
reasons listed by the Junta); it is frequent, particularly during times of
severe exchange shortage, that new applications will rapidly follow the
rejection, but during more relaxed times, as during 1971, the (few)
rejections are taken more seriously.

Once approval is secured, and imports

have cleared customs, there is no particular difficulty in obtaining the
foreign excha".lge for payment.

With me!l'lories of the piling up of commercial

-37arrears of 1955-56, and of the less dramatic one of 1966-67, still fresh
in mind, authorities have been careful not to issue import licenses
beyond expected exchange earnings since late 1966.
It is part of the INCOMEX style to avoid if possible having to say
NO formally; so, particularly with global licenses, negative signals are
frequently sent informal.ly, and are never registered as rejections.
Furthermore, as its policies are by now fairly well known, many potential
importers do not even bother to apply, saving themselves the time, trouble
.
12
and expense o f app1 ying.
Ordinary· import permits are good only for five months; 13 if imports
are not brought in within that time, a new permit or three-month extensions
of the old one must be secured.

It has been argued that such limitations

put the Colombian importer in a bargaining disadvantage vis-a-vis foreign
suppliers, who aware of th~ time pressure faced by Colombians in shopping
around, shade their prices upward.

It is Il'JCOMEX 1 s expectation that goods

imported in the "Industrial II category will be used only by the company
to which the license has been issued; when quest~oned about the legality

of reselling imported merchandise, for "industrial" companies, the answers

were surprisingly fuzzy.

'l'he license itself is clearly non-negotiable,

as it is is~ued only to a specific company or person.

The reselling of

the imported items by industrial users is apparently not strictly illegal,
but frowned upon by Il'JCO:MEX~ if nothing else because it implies that
nnormal" requirements stated in the resolution 15 request form were
misleading or false.

Companies known to be systematically selling part of

their imported industrial inputs to others are punished by INCOMEX with
total or partial rejections of future re~uests; similar ?unishment is dealt

-38to individuals or com1)anies which are discovered trying to import under
several social or private names.

INCOMEX's point is that they want to

know exactly how many imports can be traced to each industrial firm or
individual.

INCOMEX, however, does not punish temporary

11

swapping 11 or

"lending" of imported items among industrial firms; indeed, it finds
such practice as quite reasonable, particularl y if done during periods
of stringency and in a linen-specul ative ii mariner.

Apparently~ during 1971

very little re-selling or swapping of non-commer cial imports took place,
al·though some IHCOMEX officials indicated that such practice was widespread
during difficult years, e.g., 1967.

The fact that most imports are

purchased directly by companies which use them as inputs in the production
of other commodities , so that arms-length market prices for those inputs
are not obocrvcd in Colombia, makes it difficult, lf

nut

impossible, to

establish exactly the premia attached to import licenses, a premia which
in any case is very likely to fluctuate sharply between years {e.g., between

1967 and 1971).
It also follows that it is difficult to establish the meaning of price
control for imported

11

industrial 11 inputs.

In the case of "commercial " imports,

according to regulations , INCOMEX should theoretical ly coordinate its
activities with the Superintend encia de Precios (Price Control Board), to
regulate the margin at which imported goods are resold, i.e., to control
the premia derived from licenses.

S~ch control, however, is very sporadic

and unsystemati c, and takes place mainly when somebody makes a sca..~dal
about excessive margins.

Nevertheles s, INCOI".iEX claims that import controls

are superior to tariffs, inter alia, because they avoid making imports more
expensive, a doubtful claim in view of the loose control over the license
premia.

-39Conventional wisdom in Colombia regards the profitability of large
importing commercial houses as very high; in particular, hardware stores
reselling imports are popularly considered gold mines.

The Junta argues that

it tries to spread out import permits among commercial importers as much
and as fairly as it can.
There are more or less subtle ways in which the Junta discriminates
according to country of origin of potential imports.

Requests to import

television sets, for example~ are said to have better chances of approval
if exported from Spain rather than the U.S., both because Spain has a
bilateral payments agreement with Colombia and because the au.thorities
consider that the local industry will have an easier time competing with
Spanish in contrast with U.S. sets.

:Even where there e,re no explicit

bilateral agreements, the Junta de facto administers

11

gentlemen 's agreements"

with countries such as Japan, which purchase from Colombia outside coffee
agreement channels in exchange for Colombian commitments to import their
goods.

These games, of course, are also played by countries without

explicit generalized im:9ort controls,

PVF>n if'

thPy prP:::il"h mnl+.il:::i.+.Pr:::il

trade (particularly to partners with whom they a.re in surplus).

Some

Colombian officials complain that socialist c~l.l!ltries with which Colombia
has bilateral payments agreements do not advertise their goods as vigorously
as they could among potential importers; often the Junta has to nudge
importers so that they divert their purchases in that direction, for which
areas import licenses are granted more readily than for imports from, say,
the dollar area.

But the 4uantitative importance of such trade remains

small; as shown in Chapter II, during 1967-69, less than 3 percent of
Colombian imports came from what the IMF-DOT calls Soviet areas.

-40As the Colombian foreign exchange position improved, particularly
during 1971 and 1972, the role of foreign aid, and particularly that of U.S.
tied aid, declined; the use of import controls to enfcrce tying also declined
accordingly.

In earlier years, however, INCOMEX and related institutions

took strong meesures to divert purchases toward U.S. products; these included
favorable credit conditions, exemption from advance-deposit requirements,
and direct pressure on importers to buy from the U.S.
of' bitter wrangling over
etc.

14

11

positive 11 and

11

'Ihose were the days

negativeil lists,

11

additionality,"

U.s. officials were in the awkward position of simultaneously

urging Colombians to libere,lize import controls~ to use controls to enf'orce
tying, and to stop using controls to divert imports toward bilateral
partners, such as Spain and Socialist countries.
'Ihe INCOMEX performance Ci!:.£.!! 197'1 was generally praised by industrial
entrepreneurs interviewed during the middle part of that year.

In

almost all cases they compared it very favorably with the pre-1967 situation,
for which stories typically associated with import controls were told
{delays, cor:ruption, inefficiency, P.tc.).

The flexrbility, efficiency and

honesty of INCOMEX is also compared favorably with those of customs;
the coordination between HICOMEX and customs, incidentally, is quite poor.
It should be borne in mind, however, that most of these entrepreneurs ca.me
from relatively large companies, and that the foreign exchange situation
was quite relaxed during 1971, particularly in contrast with 1967 and earlier
yeras.

'Ihe major complaint against DJCOM.EX desls with imports of spare

parts, for which delays of even one month in the hand.ling of import requests
are a nuisance.

Frequently, small spa:;.~e parts are simply smuggled into

the country by employees se~t specially for that purpose to Miami and New York.

It may be note,1 that the free or black market r,eso rate during 1971 was only
10 or 15 percent above the ce1·tifice.te rate {and less than that during

1972), so using excha~ge from this source was not particularly expensive.
INCOMEX, of course, is aware of thsee goings--on, and has been considering
ways of legalizing the aitn;;:.tion, such as ex.pauding the "m.lnor" import
category, whkh now aJ.lows imports worth less than $20 (less than $40 for
books) without prior license noJ:' registra~:.on.
Entrepreneurs, p'.:l.rti s:!1.~Larly those in charge of large companies, find
I1'IC0MEX on the whole

&..

bulwa1'.'l1: against foreign competition and at the same

time an even mo:;:oe re~_iable sup:i::.:lier of' cheap i:nported inputs.

Nowada;y-s

the few controve:rsies between entrepreneurn and. IlJCONEX deal more with
imports which Jchat institution has a 1.1owed to come into the country, than
with denials of i:r-1porL :.:-e 1ues t,::; •
Beside~ the smuggling of spare parts and some consumer goods, such as
furs, perfumes, jewelry and cigarettes, INCm-:P..X feels that the system is
relatively free of ~eaks and well o~ganized, in the sense that importers
know what to expect.

Its officials argue, not without reason, that the

combination of moderate tariffs pluA import controls forms a more powerful
combination against smuggling than a situation with higher tariffs and
no import controls .

items are taken

011·~

A key element in their reasoning is that as more

of the prohibited list into the prior license one,

more uncertainty will be planted in the minds of would-be smugglers, whose
profit margins could be :.·educed or w:'i.ped out if I27C0::1EX all of a sudden permits
imports of mo<ierately taxed goods .

-42The performance of the INCOAEX import control system has a good
reputation even outside Colombia; officials from other Latin .American
countries have visited Bogota to study the workings of it 3 for possible
application in their own countries.
INCOMEX does not handle the further steps an importer must make to
obtain foreign exchange to pay for his goods, once they arrive in Colombia.
This is the responsibility of the Central Bank, with vhich the importer
must make a deposit in pesos equal to 95 percent of the needed exchange,
twenty days before making an application for an exchange registration.
Proof that goods have cleared cust.oms must also be presented.

At this stage,

the request for exchange is granted very quickly; typically the exchange
disbursement takes place about thirty da~'-s after the merchandise has gone
through customs •. The Central Bank, however, may· double check with INCOMEX
on unit dollar prices, to avoid overj_nvoicing.
Given the relatively relaxed. excl--.ange position of Colombia during
1971-72, it may be asked why no more dramatic liberalization steps have
hr:ii:>n

+.i:ikPn -
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reply that, in fact, very few import requests

are being rejected; it may be estimated that the rejection rate during
those two years has fluctuated around 10 to 15 percent of the value of all
applications.

Some officials favor placing most items in the prior

license list, eliminating both the free and the prohibited lists.

The

post-1967 trend, however, seems to be a very gradual expansion of the free
list, and an equally slow contraction of the prohibited one.

The sole

change of an item from the prohibited to t~e prior license list is said
to have powerful {and desirable) effects on local producers.
1962 and 1971 are compared, as in Tables IV-

and IV-

If just

a contraction of

-43both the free a..'ld the prohibited lists is apparent.

There remains,

nevertheles s, a lingering fear that without import controls, and in
spite of tariffs, there would be a cataclysmic upsurge of imports

{a la 1966?), and massive bankrupcies among local producers.
The Treaty of Cartagena which cre.ated the Andean group calls for an
elimination of administrat ive import restriction s among member countries,
but even for those imports there are at present doubts whether the
elimination of import controls will be very widespread or general.

Footnotes to Chapter

*

l

Mrs. He:nninia Martinez Neufeld first explained to me the subtleties of

the Colombian import licensing system.

Lillian Barros, Jose Francisco

Escandon, Stephen Kadish~ Miguel Urrutia and Francisco Thoumi were also
particularly helpful in the preparation of this chapter.

Last but not

least I must acknowledge the help received from many officials of Ii'JCOMEX
in Bogota, who were remarkably open and cooperative.

Criticisms in this

chapter toward the import control system must be clearly separated from
any judgement regarding the •11ay they carry out their tasks; indeed, my
impression of INCO:MEX off~.cials is that they are an unusually hardworking,
dedicated and public spirited g:roup ._
1.

The lists are forma"'.ly approved by the Superior Council of Foreign

Trade (Consejo Superior de Comercio Exterior), under advise from INCOMEX,
which acts as its technical secretariat.

That Collncil is presided by the

Minister of Developme~:t, and also includes ~he Ministers of Foreign
Relations, Treasury and Agriculture, plus the head of the Planning office,
the manager of the Central Bank~ the manager of the Feder~tion of Coffee

Growers, the manager o~ IFI, the director of PROEXPO, and the director of
INCOMEX.

This group also forms the core of the Council of Economic

Policy, which includes also the President of the Republic, and the Ministers
of Public Works and of Laber.

These two Councils plus the Junta :Monetaria.,

form the three key policy making bodies in the economic field.
of INCOMEX is a membe:;.- of the three bodies.

The director.

'iJi thin INCOMEX, which covers

all aspects of foreign trade, the nJunta de Importaciones 11 handles the
import control system.
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2.

Resoluti on 22 of Septemb er 22, 1970, also limits the free list to the

reimbur sable category , and to commodi ties origina ting in the same country
where they have been purchaze d.

The free list applicab le to LAFTA

countrie s is somewhat larger than that describe d above.

3.

This section relies heavily on the INF 1 s annual Report o:i Exchange

Restric tions, and on intervie ws with Colombian and officia ls in several
interam erican and interna tional institut ions.

4.

All import registat ions were divided as follows:
Officia l Market
Government

Private

Free
Market

1955

21%

7c:;%
I ./ 0

1956

21

58

21

1957-Fi rst quarter

18

67

15

5.
by

l-1-%

The free rate, generate d by a thin market, was influenc ed not only
expecta tions and other usual factors, but also by special circums tances,

particu larly cor1ditio ns in neigh·bor ir1g ·venezue la.

Unregis tered Colombo-

Venezue lan border trade played en importan t role in the fluctuat ions
o:f the free rate .

The free rate, elimina ted in November 1966, acted as

a safety valve for the import control system; general ly authori ties looked
the otter way if imports were financed through the free market.

6.

Some authori ties justifie d their strict licensin g of capital good

imports with the curious argumen t that they would simply lead to higher
demand for imported raw materia ls in the future.

Some observe rs conside red

that import restrict ions weighed more heavily on capital goods than on
raw materia ls and even consume r goods during 1963 and 1964.

l
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7. Fearing the inflation ary repercuss ions of supplying dollars at
the import rate of 9 Pesos purchased in the free market at about twice
that amount, a different ial covered by borrowing from the central Bank,
the

11

Junta Monetaria 11 establish ed a 13 .5 Peso rate for minor exports

in June 1965.

An ulterior mot·ive in taking this step, discourag ing

to minor exports, was to prepare the way for a devaluati on of the import
rate, also to 13.5 Pesos,

Technical advisers to the Junta and internati onal

civil servants had preferred a 14 Peso rate, both for minor exports and
for imports.

But given the political climate, 13.5 Pesos (a round 50

percent above the 9 Peso rate) wae the maximum acceptabl e to the authoriti es.
To show their faith in the feasilibi ty of that parity, the Colombians
launched i_n September 1965 the liberaliz ation program.

More on this in

the next cta~ter.

8.

When reference s are made to INCOMEX, in general, they refer both to

formal regulatio ns and informal opinions of IHCOMEX officials interview ed
during July-Septe mber of 1971, and during August 1972.

In fact, the

"~J1_].nta de Import.a.c iones u is only a part of the whole IfJC01·TEX organizat ion,

which also covers other aspects of foreign trade.

9.

The impressiv e evidence on overinvoi cing in pharmace uticals and

other industrie s is discussed in Constanti ne V. Vaitos, "Transfer encia
de Recurses y Preservac i6n de Rentas Monopoli sticas, 11 Revista de Planeaci6 n
y

Desarroll o, Vol. II? No. 2, July 1971 (publishe d

Departme nt, Bogot~), pp. 35-72.

by

the national Planning

For the pharmace utical companies in

the sample, an ove~prici ng averaginG 155 percent was found.

Over

invoicing is also said to occur in items such as books and machine tools,
for which it is more difficult to ascertain exact prices, due to quality
differenc es and heterogen eity of specifica tions.
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There are similarities between the Colombian style of import controls

and the operating manner of committees in charge of undergraduate admissions
in places like Yale, where demand also exceeds supply.

At both places there

is great resistance to formalize quotas, regarded as rigid, and a tendency
to fudge criteria until they become a subjective Jell-0.

Those controlling

decisions resent any attempt at defining clear-cut objective rules, which
are easily enough shown to be unable to cover fairly all possible cases,
even when those rules would yield the same results as the committees in 95
percent . of all cases •

For the sake of that 5 percent power, the administrators

prefer gentlemanly ambiguity.
11.

INCOMEX curiously argues that even though its staff may not have time to

carry out careful cost-benefit studies, the process of requesting massive
data from entrepreneurs planning a new project will force businessmen to
re-think their venture carefully.

This is bilt one example of the paternalistic

attitude often found among IHCOMEX officials.

In some cases, the study of

a given project is reduced to a quick visit to the plant proposing an
enlargement.

INCOMEX expects that requests for global licenses involve

projects which are in a fairly advanced state of study by the firm.
12.

All requests for import licenses must be accompanied by a 100 Peso fee,

and more recently, by an additional 50 Peso charge (a total of about US$ 7).
The paperwork required for making an application must also represent small
but significant expense for companies, particularly in the case of global
licenses.
firms.

Such an eXJ)ense is likely to oe proportionally higher for smaller

IIiJCOMEX finances itself partly out of the import license fees, which

gives it additional autonomy in contrast with government agencies more
dependent on the national budget.
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When approval is granted to an import request,, copies of the import

registration are sent to the Central Bank, the Customs office and to the
Colombian consul nearest to the foreign city from which the goods are
to shipped.

The Colombian consul may not issue the proper shipping

authorization without that document.
14.

See Thomas L. Hutcheson and Richard C. Porter, The Cost of Trying Aid:

A Method and Some Colombian Estimates, Princeton Studies in International
Finance No. 30, March 1972, particularly pp. 17-20,

The infamous

"additionality 11 clause in U.S. aid was abolished during the visit of
President Carlos Lleras Restrepo to the U.S., in June 1969.

